Beginning in the late 1990s, approximately half of all commercial U.S. nuclear power reactors were sold by price-regulated public utilities to independent power producers.
Introduction
Nuclear power plants currently make up 10 percent of all electric generating capacity in the United States and 20 percent of all actual generation (NRC 2010). They have been praised for their low marginal cost and lack of carbon emissions; at the same time, safety concerns continue to plague the industry. In the past two decades, a dramatic change to the industry has taken place: approximately half of all U.S. nuclear power plants have been sold off by price-regulated utilities and now operate in competitive markets. Surprisingly, there is little evidence on how ownership transfers have affected safety. This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of the impact of these nuclear power plant divestitures 1 on safety. Using data on a variety of safety measures and a difference-in-difference estimation strategy, I find no evidence that safety deteriorated; for some measures, it even improved following divestiture. Moreover, for given levels of generation, safety substantially improved.
Ownership transfers led to the alignment of private incentives to increase operating efficiency, and these gains do not appear to have come at the cost of public safety.
As electricity generation markets were deregulated in the late 1990s and early 2000s, price-regulated utilities sold off their nuclear reactors. Almost half of U.S. reactors are now owned by independent power producers. At the same time, ownership of nuclear plants became increasingly consolidated; whereas most investor-owned utilities operated one or two reactors prior to deregulation, two companies alone (Entergy and Exelon) currently own over one quarter of U.S. reactors. Concurrent with these ownership changes, generation rose: operating efficiency, as measured by the ratio of generation to capacity, increased from 75 percent in the 1990s to over 90 percent in the 2000s. The deregulation of electricity generation markets was undertaken in part to increase efficiency and lower costs. It was thought that, under rate of return regulation, incentives were not aligned for utilities to minimize costs in the generation portion of their business. Robust empirical evidence now shows that efficiency gains were indeed realized at both fossil-fuel-fired plants and nuclear plants after the restructuring of electricity markets. Davis and Wolfram (2012) attribute a 10 percentage point increase in operating efficiency at nuclear power plants to divestiture from investor-owned utilities.
While there is now some consensus that electricity market restructuring led to the alignment of private costs and thus to efficiency gains, less is known about the effect of the market changes on external costs. Even as deregulation began in the late 1990s, some feared that the independent power producers purchasing nuclear plants would ignore safety concerns in the interest of maximizing profits. Others claimed that deregulation and consolidation would improve reactor management, and that the new owners would work hard to avoid costly plant shutdowns. David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists was quoted in the New York Times as saying " [t] he new owner of a nuclear power plant clearly has a commitment to a nuclear future... you can also make the counterargument that the new owner is only trying to make a quick buck, to recoup their investment and make some money." 2 My empirical strategy exploits the fact that only half of the reactors in the U.S. were divested and that the timing of divestiture varied widely. These differences in divestiture were largely the outcome of differential electricity deregulation legislation across states. I make the identifying assumption that this timing is exogenous to nuclear safety. To examine the validity of this assumption, I test for the possibility of selection bias. Looking at pre-divestiture safety records, I find no statistically or economically significant differences between the plants that later divest and those that remain controlled by investor-owned utilities.
Unfortunately, while catastrophic events may represent the largest social cost of nuclear power, their risk is not observable directly. I am, however, able to analyze data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on five safety measures: initiating events (unplanned power changes), fires, escalated enforcement actions, 3 collective worker radiation exposure, and average worker radiation exposure. The NRC compiles these data from both operator reports and regular inspections. I choose these five measures in part because they may be the least open to manipulation by plant operators. Unplanned power changes, for instance, are not possible to hide from safety inspectors, since generation to the electrical grid is metered. Additionally, these measures represent a broad portion of the risk to plants. Initiating events cover a large portion of the internal event core damage risk to nuclear plants (Eide, Rasmuson, and Atwood 2005) . Also, the NRC's authority to use escalated enforcement actions "extends to any area of licensed activity that affects the public health and safety;"
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I thus use these as the best measure available of the failure of a reactor's operator to follow federal safety regulations. I find that divestiture leads to a 16 percent reduction in the expected number of initiating events, a 46 percent reduction in the expected number of fires, and a 29 percent reduction in the expected number of escalated enforcement actions. While the point estimates are not very precisely estimated, the magnitude of the coefficients is economically significant. Furthermore, moderate increases in the number of events can be ruled out at the five percent level. The results are robust to a number of specification checks, including various count models and OLS estimation. For radiation exposure, I find a reduction of 25 percent for collective worker exposure and 18 percent for average worker exposure. I also examine the effect of divestiture on safety for given levels of generation. This is important because the results described above include an indirect generation effect. The direct effect of divestiture on unsafe events is negative, but divestiture also increases generation, thereby increasing the exposure of the plant to an event. I find larger reductions in the expected number of unsafe events for given levels of generation, and the results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level for initiating events and 5 percent level for escalated enforcement.
The results are stable across reactor type and location, alleviating concerns about selection bias. Allowing for heterogeneity in the safety response, I find that newer and larger reactors experienced the largest effects. I find limited evidence of intra-firm spillovers, suggesting my main results are a lower bound on the overall effect. I find no effect of consolidation. There is some empirical evidence for learning over time at divested plants, consistent with anecdotal evidence.
These findings are consistent with the incentives faced by nuclear plant operators. Nuclear power plant operators have strong incentives to avoid outages. Because wholesale electricity prices are much higher than variable costs for nuclear plants, any outage leads to large losses in operating profits. Thus unsafe events that lead to plant shutdowns incur private costs for plants beyond the costs of the repairs themselves. On the other hand, maintenance to prevent unsafe events is costly if it requires a plant to shut down. Prior to divestiture, plants may have been able to pass on some of the costs of outages to their ratepayers; since this is not possible in competitive generation markets, divestiture likely changed their incentives for maintenance. Ex-ante predictions about the effect of divestiture on maintenance are not possible, for reasons discussed below. However, both anecdotal evidence and my empirical results suggest that divestiture led to improved plant management and thus to better safety records.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, restructuring transformed the electricity industry in many parts of the U.S., stimulating interest among economists and policy makers in understanding the consequences of these broad market reforms. This literature is part of a larger literature on the evolution of markets following deregulation. Electricity serves as a useful empirical setting in this broader literature for a few reasons: (1) electricity is a homogeneous good, so quality changes do not confound the analysis; (2) some states deregulated while others did not, and the timing of deregulation varied. This process, while not random, has generally been thought to be exogenous to power plant operations. Several important outcomes have been analyzed in this context, including operating efficiency (Bushnell and (Fowlie 2010 ). This paper is the first to analyze safety, which plays a crucial role in energy production and particularly in nuclear power. Nuclear power is controversial precisely because of the potential for catastrophic events, so understanding how deregulation impacted the probability of unsafe events is crucial.
This paper also contributes to the literature on nuclear power safety. Analyses of nuclear power safety emerged following accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl (e.g. David, Maude-Griffin, and Rothwell 1996 , Feinstein 1989 , Hanemann et al. 1992 , Rothwell 1989 , and Rust and Rothwell 1995 , and the recent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi facility has renewed interest in understanding the risks the public faces from nuclear plants. This paper does not claim to answer the broad questions of whether the world should use nuclear power to meet its energy needs or of how safety should be regulated. It does, however, speak to how a major market transformation in the U.S. impacted almost half of the nuclear fleet.
5 Moreover, it relates to the wider literature on the structure of the nuclear power sector (including Davis 2012 , MIT 2003 , and MIT 2009 ). This sector comprises a significant portion of the U.S. electricity industry, and interest in it has been renewed in recent years because of its status as a carbon-free source of large-scale baseload electricity generation. Third, this paper is germane to the literature on the consequences of deregulation for outcomes beyond private efficiency gains. When the airline industry was deregulated, for instance, concerns were raised about airline safety (Barnett and Higgins 1989 , Golbe 1986 , Kennet 1993 , and Rose 1990 . Importantly, though, one of the main mechanisms through which safety and profitability are related in air travel is in the consumer's demand function; this mechanism is not expected to operate in the case of nuclear power generation, as electricity is not differentiable for end-users. In related work, water privatization led to concerns about increases in water-borne illness (Galiani et al. 2005) . Papers in this literature are necessarily industry-specific: the interaction of private cost reductions with changes to quality or changes to external costs is highly context-dependent. However, this paper provides intuition for the mechanisms at work, some of which are generalizable beyond the nuclear power industry.
Background and Related Literature

Electricity Deregulation
Deregulation refers to the broad set of reforms proposed for the U.S. electricity sector in the late 1990s; the set of reforms actually implemented and their timeline varied by state. Prior to deregulation, and in states where deregulation did not occur, local monopoly utilities bundled generation, transmission, and distribution services. Local public utilities commissions (PUCs) set the prices the utilities received so the utilities could recover fixed costs plus a fair rate-of-return; one example of such regulation is average-cost pricing. This cost of service pricing is the most extreme form regulation took; typically, some incentives for generators to keep costs low were built into the regulatory process. During deregulation, proposed reforms included separating generation, transmission, distribution, and retailing components of the sector and applying various reforms to each of these. Generation was opened to competition (with transmission and distribution still considered natural monopolies), and prices, entry and exit were deregulated. Retail reforms allowed consumers to choose between competing suppliers. Overviews of the economic and political arguments motivating electricity deregulation, the various forms deregulation could take, and the ex-ante concerns about deregulation can be found in Joskow (1997) and White (1996) . As of 2010, fifteen states and the District of Columbia had restructured their electricity sector.
Divestiture refers to the process whereby utilities transfer generation assets to unregulated companies. This can refer to either transfer to an unregulated subsidiary of the regulated utility or sale to an independent power producer. In some states, this was required by legislation, to prevent market power following deregulation. For nuclear power reactors, this entry into competitive wholesale markets is the main component of deregulation expected to affect operations.
The main economic argument for generation deregulation was to increase efficiency and lower costs. Efficiency gains with deregulation are generally thought to come from aligning incentives vis-a-vis input choices, as in the Averch and Johnson (1962) model, described below, or from correcting agency problems, as in the Laffont and Tirole (1986) model. For overviews of these models and their extensions, see Baron (1989) and Kahn (1988) . There is robust empirical evidence of efficiency gains at power plants in the U.S. following deregulation (Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram 2007 , Zhang 2007 , and Davis and Wolfram 2012 ).
An important assumption in the modeling and empirical sections of this paper is that electricity deregulation was exogenous to nuclear power plant performance. The rationale for this assumption is that divestiture was tied very closely to state-level electricity deregulation, which was driven by a host of political and economic factors (Ando and Palmer 1998). Past nuclear power plant construction certainly was one motivator for deregulation, through the "stranded costs" problem. Since electricity prices were set at average rather than marginal cost, historical nuclear construction led to regulated electricity rates that were much higher than wholesale prices. Thus states with high historical nuclear fixed costs may have been more likely to deregulate (Joskow 1997, Griffin and Puller 2005) . Davis and Wolfram (2012) find a slightly higher construction cost for plants that were eventually divested, however the difference is small (4 percent) and not statistically significant. Moreover, any difference in past nuclear construction costs should be time-invariant, and as such can be controlled for in empirical specifications with fixed effects. To my knowledge, poor nuclear safety records did not play a role in electricity restructuring.
Note that the impact of divestiture should be interpreted as including two endogenous features. First, it is possible that a utility seeking to sell its nuclear reactor would invest in plant improvements prior to the sale. This is particularly likely at poor performers, which utilities might be afraid they would be unable to sell. Second, while the act of divestiture may be exogenous to plant characteristics and performance, which company buys the plant is not exogenous. That is, there were several companies that purchased divested reactors, and they likely sorted on plant characteristics. Neither feature of deregulation affects the validity of the empirical estimation in this paper, but rather the mechanisms through which the impact of divestiture operates.
Nuclear Power
There are currently 65 nuclear power plants in the U.S., accounting for 10 percent of total electric capacity. Because nuclear power plants are "baseload," meaning that they run around the clock, they contribute 20 percent of total electricity generation (NRC 2010 6 Here and throughout this paper, capacity refers to megawatts-electrical. Capacity can be measured in MWe (megawatts-electrical) or MWt (megawatts-thermal). The difference between the two arises from the loss of energy through waste heat.
plants. Once a nuclear power plant is built, its marginal costs are low.
7 Furthermore, it emits no carbon dioxide. Nuclear power also has advantages over alternative energies such as wind and solar, as it is not intermittent. Also, it can theoretically be built in areas where wind and solar are cost ineffective and hydroelectric resources are unavailable. However, nuclear power has several large disadvantages. Plants are expensive to build, so the levelized cost of nuclear power may be higher than that of fossil fuel plants (Davis 2012 ). Accidents at nuclear power plants can be catastrophic, and the public has been understandably wary in the wake of the events at Three Mile Island (in 1979), Chernobyl (in 1986), and Fukushima (in 2011). An additional concern is the potential for terrorists to acquire radioactive materials or attack U.S. nuclear sites. Finally, one of the main issues raised by environmentalists is the treatment, storage, and transport of spent nuclear fuel. The U.S. currently has no national program to deal with nuclear waste; neither does it reuse spent fuel. Spent fuel assemblies are generally stored in pools at power plants, but some plants have reached their capacity for storing spent fuel in pools. Additional storage is available in dry casks at power plants or at separate storage facilities. As of 2009, approximately 60,000 metric tons of spent fuel were stored at power plants (NRC 2010). Nuclear power plant safety is regulated in the U.S. by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a government agency. The NRC also regulates nuclear research facilities and radioactive waste. It is responsible for licensing and inspections. The NRC has the ability to require unsafe plants to shut down; it can also apply fines for safety violations. The NRC does not appear to enforce its safety regulations differentially between price-regulated and divested plants. 8 Incentives for safety may be affected by liability insurance, which is highly regulated. Both investor-owned utilities and independent power producers are regulated according to the Price-Anderson Act (PAA). The PAA has a three-tiered liability system for all facilities. Nuclear power operating companies are required to purchase the maximum insurance coverage available in the private market, $375 million annually as of 2010. The second tier is a joint pool; companies are required to pay retrospective premiums in the event of an accident. Companies must prove to the NRC that they will be able to make these payments by, for instance, posting a bond. Retrospective payment is currently set at approximately $112 million per reactor per incident. The federal government is responsible for all payments 7 According to the EIA's Electric Power Annual (EIA 2011), variable costs (including operating, maintenance, and fuel) were 2.17 cents per kilowatt-hour for nuclear plants and 4 above this primary and secondary coverage. The Price-Anderson Act covers liability claims but not on-site damages; the NRC separately requires companies to maintain funds for these damages.
Incentives and Safety
To provide context for the empirical results that follow, I discuss the incentives for safety faced by nuclear power plants; a formal derivation of this model is given in Appendix 1. Most of the costs of a nuclear power plant are fixed and are incurred at the time of construction. The plants' marginal cost is much lower than the market price of electricity generation, which is determined by the marginal cost of the marginal plant. 9 According to a recent Consider a profit-maximizing plant choosing a level of maintenance, which affects either reliability (i.e., avoiding unplanned outages), safety, or both. The costs of unreliability are private (limited to lost revenues for the plant) while safety costs are social (representing risk to the general public). 12 In many cases, the maintenance that reduces outages has complementarities with safety (MIT 2003). The firm chooses the level of maintenance that equates private marginal benefits (e.g., avoiding unplanned outages) with private marginal costs (maintenance costs as well as foregone revenues if the plant must be down for repairs).
Since not all safety costs are internalized, the firm chooses a lower level of safety maintenance than is socially optimal. Furthermore, if the same maintenance improves both reliability and 9 For representative supply and demand curves showing nuclear marginal costs compared to fossil fuel costs, see Griffin and Puller (2005) . 10 Vary rarely, nuclear plants are asked to reduce generation to preserve stability on the electrical grid. 11 There is potential for the owner of a nuclear power plant to use outages to exercise market power, if it owns other generators. However, if the other generators have higher marginal costs than the nuclear plant, exercising market power by shutting down the nuclear plant is not the first-best strategy of the firm. Rather, the firm would take the higher cost plant offline. Moreover, if the nuclear power plant has a firm contract to sell, the owner will be required to purchase replacement power when the plant is down. Since the replacement power is more costly than the nuclear plant's generation, the firm has no incentive to exercise market power by taking the nuclear plant offline.
12 Indeed, liability for nuclear power plants is capped in the U.S. under the Price-Anderson Act described in section 2.2.
safety, the sub-optimal level of maintenance leads to socially sub-optimal levels of both reliability and safety. If, however, reliability maintenance and safety maintenance are unrelated, the firm will choose the socially optimal level of reliability but a sub-optimal level of safety.
The incentives are less clear under rate of return regulation. As described in section 2.1, prices in regulated electricity markets are set by local public utilities commissions (PUCs) so that monopoly utilities recover their costs. Accordingly, variable costs are passed on to rate payers, and utilities are additionally allowed a fair rate-of-return on their fixed costs. If the regulatory compact is that the utilities commission will allow the utility to pass on all costs to consumers, then the regulated plant has no incentive to minimize costs. In practice regulation usually involves some incentives for generators, but utilities are typically able to pass on to consumers a greater portion of their costs than are independent power producers.
13
In regulated environments, when a nuclear power plant is not generating, the utility will substitute with a more expensive plant (for instance, natural gas-fired), and then pass on this higher generation cost to its customers. Thus the incentives to avoid unplanned outages may be lower at a plant operating under rate-of-return regulation. In the short term, this is mitigated by the ability of the regulated plant to pass on its maintenance costs. In the long term, however, a deregulated plant may have a greater incentive to improve technical efficiency to lower maintenance costs.
As described in section 2.1, a key argument for electricity deregulation was to increase efficiency by aligning cost incentives and correcting agency problems. Davis and Wolfram (2012) find that reactors are available to generate for a significantly higher percentage of the time following divestiture. This improved operating efficiency appears to have come in the form of shorter refueling outages, enabled by changes in management practices.
14 One newspaper article describes Entergy, one of the larger owners of divested plants, flying a specialist and his equipment on the company jet from one reactor to another to fix an electrical generator. hen you've got hundreds of millions invested -and no regulators or fuel-adjustor clauses, just the competitive marketplace -you must make all your decisions toward the middle of the road and away from the shoulders... As a prudent business matter, you simply cannot risk a long shutdown costing a million dollars a day in lost revenue while all your expenses go on."
14 For instance, one article described how "America's deregulation of wholesale power markets put a painful squeeze on the country's dozens of nuclear plants, many of which were run as one-shot investments by incompetent local utilities. That is rapidly changing thanks to a flurry of mergers and joint ventures that is consolidating the industry into the hands of serious managers. Where practices that improve reliability also improve safety, divested plants may have similarly improved safety records. For instance, unplanned outages and power changes, which represent both reliability and safety costs, might be expected to fall following divestiture. This possibility is explored in the empirical section of this paper. On the other hand, safety incidents that do not affect plant reliability may not fall after divestiture. In the case where safety and reliability are uncorrelated, the effect of divestiture on safety will depend on whether the divested plant internalizes more or less of the cost of a safety event. Liability under the Price-Anderson Act does not differentiate between plants owned by investor-owned utilities and those owned by independent power producers. However, divested plants could internalize more or less of the cost of a safety event if, for instance, they are subject to a differential level of public scrutiny following an accident or place differential value on reputation.
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As described in section 2, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulates nuclear safety in the U.S. With perfect information and regulatory oversight, the socially optimal level of safety could be achieved in both the price-regulated and competitive generation markets. Note that there is still room for safety to improve following divestiture: if divested plants attain greater technical efficiency because of the alignment of cost incentives for reliability, the socially optimal level of maintenance would be higher.
In addition to the framework I present here, two theoretical models could be applied under price regulation: (1) the Averch-Johnson (1962) model, in which firms over-invest in capital, and (2) agency models, such as Laffont and Tirole (1986) , in which firms exert sub-optimal levels of effort. Averch and Johnson show that plants under rate-of-return regulation overinvest in capital relative to labor. The intuition is simple; under rate-of-return regulation, a firm's profits are a function of its capital investments. If the allowed rate-of-return on investment is higher than the firm's cost of capital, the firm over-invests in capital relative to labor. The Averch-Johnson effect may explain the construction of nuclear power plants, but it is likely not relevant in the operation of nuclear plants. A long history of cost overruns in nuclear power plant construction meant that many local regulators were wary of approving further capital expenditures (Joskow and Schmalensee 1986). Fabrizio et al. (2007) cite agency models in explaining why deregulation may improve operating efficiency at thermal power plants. In agency models such as Laffont and Tirole (1986) , efforts to run a firm efficiently by reducing costs provides some disutility to the firm's manager. The regulator fails to compensate the manager for this disutility, perhaps and Safer." New York Times, February 18. 16 The empirical portion of this paper examines whether consolidation affected safety records: companies that own many plants may internalize more safety costs if an incident at one plant leads to scrutiny at all plants.
because effort is unobservable or unverifiable, so the manager exerts less effort than is socially optimal. For nuclear plants, efforts to maintain reliability and safety are unobservable to public utilities commissions, since outages and accidents are stochastic. A manager could exert minimal effort while blaming outages and accidents on bad luck. In the case of nuclear plants this is likely mitigated by an aversion on the part of both the manager and the public utilities commission to the public scrutiny that follows extended outages or severe accidents. In that case, managers would be more willing to exert effort to maintain safety and reliability, and regulators would be less willing to treat outages and accidents as bad luck. Finally, an argument similar to that made by Laffont and Tirole is made by Kahn (1988) ; he points out that utilities that are lax about cost reductions and other efficiency gains may not engage in cross-firm cooperation.
Overall, the impact of divestiture on plant safety is theoretically ambiguous. It depends crucially on a number of issues, including (1) whether state regulators allowed the monopoly utility prior to divestiture to pass on maintenance costs and/or replacement power costs; (2) whether maintenance for reliability has additional safety benefits; (3) whether divested plants internalize more or less of the cost of safety events; and (4) the level of federal 17 safety regulations. Since many of these factors are unobservable, I next turn to empirical evidence of the effect of divestiture.
Data
Power Plant Safety
For the empirical analysis, I compile data on a variety of risks to nuclear plants. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) tracks a number of safety measures for all reactors in the United States. Reactor operators are required, under the Code of Federal Regulations (10 C.F.R. §50), to provide reports to the NRC following any shutdown, deviation from technical specifications, or event resulting in degraded plant safety. These licensee event reports contain information by date and by plant on the specific event or condition involved, including narrative descriptions. These are publicly available from the NRC. Additionally, the NRC performs regular plant inspections. These can involve inspectors permanently stationed at the plant, regional inspectors, and inspectors for specific areas such as health physics or security. Inspections may involve reviewing records, observing drills and simulations, observing maintenance procedures, and testing equipment. Results are made public by the NRC. The NRC additionally synthesizes and publishes data on safety measures of particular interest for this study:
• initiating events, including unplanned outages and power changes I also analyze fires, a safety event of particular interest to the NRC, for which I have data since 1990. The NRC dataset, "Fire Events Data from Licensee Event Reports," gives the original source document citation, the event date, the plant's mode at the time of the fire (e.g., power operating, refueling), operating capacity on the date of the fire, the physical area involved, (e.g., turbine building versus auxiliary building), and whether an alert was declared (either because more than 15 minutes were required to extinguish the fire, or because the fire affected the safety systems need for plant shutdown). Following a fire at the Browns Ferry plant in 1975, 18 the NRC revised fire regulations. The NRC now performs fire inspections on a regular basis and analyzes fire events for national trends. However, as recently as 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report calling for stricter regulations. The consequences of a fire depend on both where the fire starts (for instance, whether it is close to the reactor building), and on how rapidly the fire can be extinguished. According to the GAO (2008) report, "[t]he most commonly reported cause of fires was electrical followed by maintenance-related causes and the ignition of oil-based lubricants or coolant. Although 13 fires were classified as significant alerts, and some of these fires damaged or destroyed unit equipment, NRC officials stated that none of these fires degraded units' safe shutdown capabilities or resulted in damage to nuclear units' core or containment buildings" (p 4). The report concluded that the NRC still needs to resolve several long-standing issues. Additionally, I observe annual radiation exposure to individuals at the plant since 1974, using data from the NRC's "Occupational Radiation Exposure at Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors and Other Facilities (NUREG-0713)." Plants are required to report the radiation exposure of each monitored worker to the NRC, which reviews radiation control and monitoring during its regular plant inspections. 19 Monitoring procedures vary over time, but details of the regulation are given by 10 C.F.R. §20, "Standards for Protection against Radiation," which describes the "as low as (is) reasonably achievable" guidelines for radiation doses. Since the number of individuals could systematically vary across time (for instance, if divested plants employ fewer people), I analyze two separate measures. The first is collective worker radiation exposure, which sums exposure across all people; the second is average worker radiation exposure, which normalizes by the number of individuals monitored. 20 Data are at the annual facility level, in contrast to the other measures. Reporting procedures at plants with both operational reactors and permanently shut-down reactors vary: at some facilities, radiation exposure is reported separately for each reactor, whereas at some facilities they are reported in a combined measure. I drop observations that combine operational and permanently shut-down reactors (Browns Ferry for all years, Dresden for all years, Indian Point 2 prior to 2004, San Onofre prior to 1999, and Three Mile Island for all years). A final measure of interest for safety is on "escalated enforcement," and is available in the form of NRC dataset "Escalated Enforcement Actions Issued to Reactor Licensees." This tracks, since 1996, the notices of violation and penalties the NRC has imposed on reactors, 21 ranked according to severity level. It is part of the NRC's enforcement program, which focuses on compliance with regulatory requirements and identification and correction of violations. Three sanctions are possible: notices of violation (NOVs), civil penalties (i.e., monetary fines), and orders (e.g., to suspend operations). Minor violations are documented, but the lowest level of violations are not part of the "escalated enforcement" program. 22 For each case, the NRC publicly posts the violation type (NOV and/or order) and severity, the amount of any civil penalty, the date issued, and a short description. This measure tends to 19 For instance, a 2003 inspection report for Beaver Valley described NRC review of personnel dosimeters; frisking instruments; radiation portal monitors; protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus; radiological work permits; and daily health physics status meetings. 20 The collective exposure measure, summing across workers, may be the most relevant measure of overall exposure. If, however, there are nonlinearities in the dose response function, then the average exposure for individual workers is also of interest. 21 For plants with multiple reactors, notices of violation and penalties may refer to only one reactor, but more commonly refer to all the reactors at the plant. 22 Additional information on the enforcement process is available in the NRC Enforcement Manual on the NRC website.
lead to public scrutiny; the NRC may call a public meeting or issue a press release, and the violations are often reported by the media. 23 
Generation and Divestitures
Generation data are from the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (EIA) Power Plant Report (EIA-923). This survey (previously published as the EIA-906 and EIA-759 reports) provides monthly net generation in megawatt-hours for each nuclear reactor. I include only reactors operating as of January 1, 2000; this excludes a few reactors that were closed during the 1980s and 1990s. 24 To calculate capacity factor, I normalize generation by reactor design capacity. Reactor design capacity is from the EIA "Nuclear Power Generation and Fuel Cycle Report 1997, Appendix C: Nuclear Units Ordered in the United States, 1953-1996." Divestiture dates are from Davis and Wolfram (2012); they compile the dates from the EIA and cross-check them against SEC filings. Table 1 gives summary statistics on the five safety measures of interest plus generation and capacity factor for all 103 power reactors used in my analysis. 25 The average reactor has slightly fewer than one initiating event per year. Fires are quite rare. Worker radiation exposure averages 116 person-REMs per year. In 2008, this corresponded to roughly 1,300 workers per facility with an average dose of 0.1 rem and a maximum dose of 0.2 rem; for comparison, the average person in the U.S. receives 0.3 rem from background sources of radiation and 0.3 rem from man-made sources (NCRP 2009). The average unit has one escalated enforcement intervention every two years, while producing over 7 million MWh of electricity. The average capacity factor was 88 percent. Note that capacity factors can be negative, since generation measured is net, rather than gross. It can also be greater than 100 percent, because of uprates that allow the unit to produce more generation than the initial design allowed. To examine the potential for selection bias, table 2 shows mean values for each variable by the reactors' eventual divestiture status. Data are from 1996-1998; 1996 is the first year for which all safety measures are available, and 1998 is the last year in which no plants 23 See, e.g., Whitaker, Barbara. 2007. "Indian Point Guard Slept on Job, N.R.C. Says." New York Times, September 2.
Summary Statistics and Pre-Treatment Observables
24 Most of these reactors were small and experimental. Exceptions include Browns Ferry 1, Millstone 1, and San Onofre 1. 25 There are currently 104 reactors in operation. For the empirical section of this paper, I drop Browns Ferry 1. This reactor was shut down from 1985 to 2007, and re-opened only following substantial investment.
are divested. Panel A shows that the safety measures are not statistically different at the 5 percent level between the plants that later divest and those that do not. Panel B shows that reliability measures are statistically different at the 1 percent level; plants that were later divested have substantially lower generation levels and capacity factors. As Davis and Wolfram (2012) discuss, reactors that were later divested had much lower generation in the late 1990s, which is explained by several long outages at a few plants.
Finally, panel C examines differences in observable fixed reactor characteristics. There is a statistically significant difference in the proportion of boiling water reactors (BWRs) divested versus pressurized water reactors (PWRs). As such, I will test whether the effect of divestiture is robust to considering each type separately. There is no significant difference in age, capacity, number of reactors at each plant, or manufacturer (with the exception of reactors made by General Electric). There is a difference in the location of the divested facilities; this is not surprising, given the regional differences in deregulation patterns. To address concerns about selection bias, I later examine the robustness of the main results to excluding certain states and regions.
Empirical Evidence
Graphical Analysis
As a first pass, I plot unsafe events across time for a set of divested reactors against a set of control reactors. Figure 1 shows the sum of the three count variables (initiating events, fires, and escalated enforcement) 26 for fourteen "case" reactors divested in 2001 to Exelon 27 compared to all "control" reactors that were never divested. These "case" reactors (two reactors each at the Braidwood, Byron, Dresden, La Salle, Limerick, Peach Bottom, and Quad Cities plants) are chosen because they share a divestiture date of January 1, 2001 and thus can be shown easily on one graph; evidence for all divested reactors follows. Several features of the graph are worth noting. First, the number of incidents has declined across time. Second, the trajectory at the plants that eventually divested appears indistinguishable from the control plants in the pre-period. Finally, the number of incidents at the Exelon plants has declined since divestiture relative to the control plants. 26 Summing across the three variables is an imperfect measure, since some double-counting is involved. For instance, a fire may set off an initiating event, or a severe initiating event may trigger escalated enforcement actions. As such, this measure is meant merely to serve as an illustration. The empirical analysis that follows considers each variable separately. 27 These reactors were previously owned by either Commonwealth Edison Company or Philadelphia Electric Company. These two companies merged in 2000 to form Exelon, which now operates these reactors and three others in competitive markets.
Next, I plot an event study graph of the effect of divestiture on each safety measure at the quarterly level for all plants, intended to motivate the regressions that follow. This plot has the advantage of allowing me to examine pre-treatment trends in the number of unsafe events. While table 2 showed no difference in the pre-divestiture mean levels of unsafe events, this plot looks more flexibly at trends. Specifically, I plot the coefficients β j from the following regression:
where τ i,t denotes the quarter relative to divestiture, with τ i,−19 denoting nineteen quarters prior to divestiture, τ i,0 denoting the quarter of divestiture, etc. The dummy variables v t are quarter-of-sample effects. Thus the plotted coefficients β j compare case reactors to the control reactors that never divest, net of time effects. The time effects play an important role, as unsafe events have generally been trending down; not including them would thus overstate the effect of divestiture. Figure 2 shows this for the sum of the three count variables: initiating events, fires, and escalated enforcement. 28 The figure additionally shows the pre-divestiture and post-divestiture means (
There is a decrease in incidents following divestiture, although it is smaller than the quarterly noise. The effect is not immediate, implying that there may be an adjustment period following divestiture, or there may be learning over time at divested units. The variance in the measure appears to decrease following divestiture; this is likely a direct implication of the count nature of the data. For a Poisson process, any reduction in the mean will also imply a reduction in the variance.
Overall, the graphical evidence indicates that divestiture had a small negative effect on the quarterly count of safety incidents. The effect is delayed and may have a downward trend, indicating either slow adjustment, learning over time, or both. The effect of divestiture is small relative to the noise. However, noise decreases in the post-divestiture period.
Regression Analysis
I next provide formal tests of the effect of divestiture on safety. Since initiating events, fires, and escalated enforcement are count variables with a large number of zero observations, OLS is not expected to perform well. Accordingly, I begin with a standard count specification, the Poisson regression with fixed effects. The probability of a given number of events y i,t occurring in a year is 28 Figures A.1-A.3 in Appendix 2 show the coefficients for each individual type of event.
with x it B = β ·divest i,t +α i +v t +ε i,t and y it = 0, 1, 2... Here, divest i,t is a divestiture dummy, α i is a reactor fixed effect, and v t is a set of year effects. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 repetitions and clustered by reactor to account for arbitrary dependence across years. 29 The fixed effects α i are an important feature of this model; in addition to flexibly controlling for unobserved characteristics, they help alleviate the overdispersion problem in Poisson models. The Poisson process assumes equality of the mean and variance, whereas in empirical settings the variance is often larger than the mean. This overdispersion leads to faulty inference (Type I error), with the null hypothesis rejected when it should not be. Fixed effects partially alleviate the problem by requiring only that the mean and variance be equal within groups, thus allowing for greater heterogeneity. For specifications using radiation exposure, OLS regressions are used since radiation exposure is a continuous variable. These data are collected by plant rather than reactor, so I include facility fixed effects
One limitation of the estimates given in the previous two equations is that they are for the net effect of divestiture on safety, and are composed of two effects: the direct effect of divestiture plus an indirect effect through generation. That is, since the plants are operating for a greater percentage of the time, they may be more exposed to unsafe events. Hence an alternative outcome of interest is not the overall effect on safety, but rather the effect on the number of unsafe events for a given level of generation. One way to allow for this possibility empirically is to scale the safety variables by capacity factor (realized generation as a percent of total possible generation) in each year; this is analogous to the engineering analyses that scale by reactor critical-years. This approach is not feasible at a monthly level; noise is introduced by large outliers in months when unsafe events occur despite very low capacity factors. These outliers can occur, for instance, if an unsafe event occurs early in the month and is then followed by an extended outage. Regressions at the annual level largely alleviate this problem; they smooth across months with low capacity factors. As such, all regressions are run at the annual level. For the results shown, I have dropped the approximately thirty observations for which capacity factor is less than 0.01. For the count variables, the normalization is accomplished by including capacity factor as an exposure variable (i.e., as a regressor, with the coefficient on the logged variable equal to 1) in the Poisson specification. For the continuous variables, the left-hand side variable is divided by capacity factor.
Results for both normalized and non-normalized outcome variables are given in table 3. Panel A shows the total effect of divestiture on safety, whereas panel B shows the effect for a given capacity factor. To compare the magnitude in the OLS specifications with the magnitude in the count specifications, I have shown the percentage change in the expected number of counts attributable to divestiture for all regressions.
30 For all five of the safety measures, the coefficient on divestiture is negative in panel A. For initiating events, the coefficient is -0.18; for fires, the coefficient is -0.62; and for escalated enforcement, the coefficient is -0.35. For collective worker radiation exposure, divestiture is associated with a drop of 42 person-rems; average exposure drops by 0.03 rems. While the point estimates are not precisely estimated, the magnitude of the coefficient is economically significant for all five measures. For initiating events, for instance, divestiture leads to a 16 percent reduction in the expected monthly event count. For fires, the change is -46 percent, and for escalated enforcement the change is -29 percent. Furthermore, some moderate positive effects can be ruled out at the 5 percent level: for initiating events, the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval is 0.07; for escalated enforcement, it is 0.04. When the dependent variable is scaled by capacity factor (panel B), the coefficient on divestiture is more negative. Divestiture leads to a 27 percent change in initiating events for a given capacity factor, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. For fires, the change in expected value is 54 percent (significant at the 10 percent level), and for escalated enforcement, 38 percent (significant at the 5 percent level). For the two worker radiation exposure variables, the effect is even larger, but it is not precisely estimated.
Overall, it appears that divestitures did not lead to worsened safety records, and they may have led to some decreases in unsafe events. Moreover, divestitures increased generation, and controlling for this, safety substantially improved. Both the total effect on safety (when unscaled by capacity factor) and the effect controlling for generation are of policy interest. As such, all tables throughout this paper provide estimates for both outcomes.
These results match anecdotal evidence that deregulation led to improved safety. Whereas the NRC had expressed concerns about plant safety following deregulation, a regional administrator said in 2001 that "[m]ost people have gotten the understanding if you do it right 30 The percentage change in the expected number of counts is defined as . For the count specifications, E[y it |d it ; α i , v t ] = exp(β ·divest i,t +α i +v t ). Accordingly, the percentage change in the expected number of counts is equal to exp(β) − 1. For the OLS specifications, E[y it |d it ; α i , v t ] = β · divest i,t + α i + v t . Accordingly, the percentage change in the expected number of counts is equal to the first time, and you emphasize safety and managing things better, it has a positive effect on the bottom line." 31 
Simultaneity between Safety and Generation
Ideally, one would treat the simultaneity between safety and generation as a full system of equations to estimate the direct effect of divestiture on each. To understand this simultaneity, consider two cases. First, if a fire occurs in the turbine area, the plant must shut down until repairs can be made; in this case, unsafe events lead to lower generation. On the other hand, if a plant shuts down for some exogenous reason, it is less likely to have a fire, because the turbine is not moving. In this case, increased generation leads to more unsafe events. Throughout this section, I focus on initiating events and fires, for which this intuition is most applicable. It is less clear that there is simultaneity between generation and escalated enforcement (which are the product of a long-term evaluation by the NRC) or between generation and radiation exposure.
Unfortunately, because I do not observe the generation level at a plant prior to a fire, the direct effect of generation on safety cannot be observed separately from the direct effect of safety on generation. While I do observe the total generation for a month, this is conditional on whether a fire occurred.
The full system of equations is
Here s is an unsafe event, g is generation, d is a divestiture dummy (the variable of interest), and X is a vector of exogenous variables. The direct effect of divestiture on each endogenous varaible cannot be estimated econometrically for this system, unless there is an instrumental variable for each equation. Unfortunately, there are no credible candidates for such instruments. Refueling outages, for instance, might affect unsafe events only through their impact on generation, but refueling outages occur at the same time as other planned maintenance, which is certainly correlated with safety.
Calculating the Direct Effect of Divestiture on Safety
However, by making certain assumptions, the direct effect of divestiture on safety can be calculated from this system. Intuitively, the direct effect of divestiture on unsafe events could be positive or negative, but divestiture also increases generation, thereby increasing the exposure of the plant to an event. Then the direct effect on divestiture will be more negative, or less positive, than the total effect. Consider the total derivative df dd
. We want to know Note that the Davis and Wolfram estimate is also for the total effect, which includes the indirect effect divestiture on generation through safety. However, the difference between the direct and total effects in this case are likely small, since unsafe events are infrequent. Accordingly, assume a direct effect of 10 percent for now; the difference between the direct and indirect effects are explored below. Also, make the neutral assumption that ∂f ∂g · g s = 1; a one percent increase in generation time leads to an expected increase in unsafe events of one percent. 32 Finally, recall that the total effect of divestiture
is empirically estimated to be a reduction of 16 percent for initiating events and 46 percent for fires.
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Then the direct effect of divestiture on unsafe events is calculated to be -0.26 for initiating events and -0.56 for fires. Thus while divestiture leads to a total effect of a reduction of 16 percent in initiating events, the direct effect is a reduction of 26 percent. The difference arises from the indirect effect through generation. These results do not change much when the relationship between generation and unsafe events is allowed to vary. For 
Calculating the Direct Effect of Divestiture on Generation
A similar exercise can be performed for the effect of divestiture on generation. As described above, this is likely to be very close to the total effect: there are few unsafe events in any given month, so the indirect effect of these incidents on generation is likely to be small. Suppose the elasticity of generation with respect to initiating events is -0.016: a one percent increase in events leads to an expected decrease in generation of 0.016 percent. This assumed elasticity is derived from (1) noting that initiating events only occur in approximately 10 percent of months, and (2) assuming that an incident leads to five days of lost generation time, i.e., 13 percent of the month's generation. Similarly, the elasticity of generation with respect to fires is -0.002, from noting that fires occur in 0.7 percent of months and assuming eight days of lost generation time. 34 Finally, recall that the total effect of divestiture is estimated by Davis and Wolfram (2012) to be an increase in generation of 10 percent. Then the direct effect of divestiture on generation, after accounting for both fires and initiating events, is calculated to be 9 percent. This is very close to the total effect of 10 percent, because unsafe events occur fairly infrequently.
Robustness Checks
Several robustness checks give very similar results (table 4) . First, I estimate a conditional negative binomial with fixed effects specification in columns (1), (4), and (7). 35 This specification is sometimes used to further alleviate the overdispersion problem in Poisson models. However, the Poisson model may be preferred, since the individual effects α i enter the conditional negative binomial specification only in the variance parameter. That is, this specification does not allow for heterogeneity in the mean across units (Allison and Waterman 2002 ). An alternative version of the negative binomial model is unconditional: the individual effects α i enter as dummy variables. This can leads to an incidental parameters problem for short panels, although simulations have found the resulting bias to be small (Allison and Waterman 2002) . Columns (2), (5), and (8) give results for this unconditional negative binomial model with mean dispersion parameterization. 36 All point estimates and standard errors are very similar to the results given by the Poisson model. Finally, I show OLS specifications in columns (3), (6) , and (9) . To compare the magnitude in the OLS specifications with the magnitude in the count specifications, I show the percentage change in the expected number of counts attributable to divestiture for all regressions. Overall, the results are stable to various assumptions on functional form. Accordingly, for all future regressions using the three count variables, I show results for the Poisson specification.
34 I examined daily generation data and descriptions for twenty randomly selected fires and twenty randomly selected initiating events. The mean number of days with generation below 50 percent of capacity following the event was four for initiating events and seven for fires. There were typically a few more days of ramping with generation levels slightly lower than 100 percent of capacity. 35 The fixed-effects negative binomial model begins with a Poisson specification and then assumes the Poisson parameter follows a gamma(exp(x it B), α i ) distribution. This implies that the variance is proportional to the mean. The α i parameter is allowed to vary by reactor in the fixed-effects specification. 36 Results are nearly identical for a constant dispersion parameterization.
Heterogeneity
I next explore whether heterogeneity can also be observed across reactor fixed characteristics (tables 5a and 5b). I first divide reactors according to type (BWR versus PWR). Since BWR reactors were more likely to divested, one might worry about either bias from selection or about external validity. With the exception of the collective worker radiation exposure equations (column 4), the coefficient on divestiture is not statistically different for BWR versus PWR reactors. For collective worker radiation exposure, results are sensitive to the type of reactor considered I next divide reactors by age, defining newer reactors (51 of 103) as those entering commerical operations in 1979 or later. Finally, I divide by design capacity, defining large reactors (49 of 103) as those with current capacity of at least 1000 MW. Age and size are not correlated with divestiture (table 2), but heterogeneity in the effect of divestiture does appear. There is some evidence that newer and larger reactors improved more, particularly for initiating events and escalated enforcement. The size and age definitions are highly correlated: the majority of newer reactors are large, and the majority of older reactors are small. As such, there is unfortunately insufficient power to separately test the effects of size and age.
State-Level Selection
Next I exclude a series of states to address potential selection concerns. First I exclude Michigan, where some but not all reactors were divested; in all other states, either all or none were divested. Second, I exclude California, where fossil fuel plants but not nuclear plants were divested. Furthermore, one of the nuclear plants (Diablo Canyon) is subject to strong incentive regulations. Third, I exclude Iowa and Wisconsin, where reactors were divested but the electricity market was not deregulated. Finally, I exclude the Northeast, where most divestitures occurred, to see if unobserved regional differences drive the results.
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For all four specifications (tables 6a and 6b), the results are robust. The coefficient on divestiture is almost always negative, and the magnitudes are largely unchanged from the main specification. One exception is collective worker radiation exposure, which is sensitive to excluding the Northeast. 37 Interestingly, Northeast Utilities adopted a strategy of cutting costs (in anticipation of deregulation, and prior to any divestitures) that later proved to compromise safety. An L.A. Times article in 1996 described an industry leader saying that "Northeast Utilities showed the industry how short-term cost-saving measures lead to safety violations and Nuclear Regulatory Commission scrutiny, which adds huge expense even if the nuclear plant keeps operating" (Source: Kraul, Chris. 1996. "Twilight of the Nukes?" Los Angeles Times, October 13).
Spillovers and Consolidation
Narrative evidence suggests that there have been spillovers of safety practices across plants, including to the companies operating non-divested plants. 38 There are several organizations that facilitate knowledge-sharing across the plants: the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), the U.S.-based Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and EUCG. INPO, for institute, shares best practices regarding safety; EUCG shares blinded financial and management strategies with its members. If the owners of divested plants share their practices with the owners of non-divested plants, the regression results above will give a lower bound on the overall effect of divestiture. The control group (non-divested plants) will have been impacted by divestiture, implying a poor counterfactual. If the control group improves following divestiture, the coefficient on the divestiture dummy will be smaller than the true effect on the divested plants. Additionally, the regression results will fail to capture the effect on the non-divested plants. It is not possible to empirically test for these spillovers across all plants. There is some suggestive evidence that this has occurred; for instance, safety records have improved nationwide in the last decade. This could also, however, be the result of other changes, such as more stringent NRC regulations. It is possible to look for evidence of one type of spillover: intra-firm spillovers between divested and non-divested plants. Three companies currently own both divested and nondivested reactors: Entergy, Dominion, and NextEra (formerly FPL Group). I add a dummy variable to the main specification, equal to one for each reactor that is not divested but is owned by one of these three companies (a total of thirteen reactors). These regressions compare three groups of reactors: divested units, units that were not divested but are owned by a company with other divested units, and units that were not divested and whose parent company owns no divested units. Results are given in table 7. The coefficient on divestiture is similar to the main results for each safety measure. For the co-ownership variable, results are generally negative in the non-normalized regressions but not significantly different from zero. For escalated enforcement, the coefficient on the co-ownership variable is economically significant; it is also statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level for the nonnormalized outcome variable and at the 10 percent level for the normalized outcome variable. One possible explanation is that operators fear scrutiny at all of their plants if an escalated enforcement action is taken at one plant.
Note that this regression can only identify spillovers within companies relative to those across companies. Indeed, if spillovers across companies are as large as spillovers within companies, this coefficient would be zero. Unfortunately, it is not possible to test for spillovers across companies.
Similarly, one might expect consolidation to have an effect. In 1996, before electricity deregulation, there were 44 companies operating the 66 plants in the U.S. In 2009, there were 26 companies operating the same plants in the U.S. Consolidation could improve plant safety records in a number of ways: through intra-firm spillovers, economies of scale (for instance, the ability to move maintenance teams from plant to plant), and through reputation effects (an incident at one plant leading to increased scrutiny at all plants). However, I do not find evidence for a consolidation effect (table 8) . Here the consolidation variable is defined as the number of other reactors owned by the same company. In these regressions, the coefficient on divestiture remains negative, and the coefficient on consolidation is approximately zero in four equations. For collective worker radiation exposure, the coefficient on consolidation is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in the non-normalized results.
Learning
There is some evidence that the benefits of divestiture would increase over time, both because some plant modifications would take time 39 and because the companies would learn over time. The event study graph (figure 2) showed some evidence of a change in the trend of safety records at divested relative to non-divested plants. Accordingly, I add linear trends pre-and post-divestiture at divested plants (because of the year effects, there is insufficient variation to test for national trends at all plants), with results in table 9. The coefficient on the linear trend is scaled to represent a three-year change. Overall, trends post-divestiture are negative, consistent with learning.
Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of divestiture on nuclear power plant safety in the United States. I examine both the total effect of divestiture on safety and the effect when controlling for increased generation levels. The total effect is composed of both the direct effect on safety and an indirect effect. The latter arises from the fact that generation increased following divestiture, and thus plants may have experienced an increase in exposure to unsafe events. The total drop in safety incidents is estimated to be 16 percent for initiating events, 46 percent for fires, and 29 percent for escalated enforcement. While none of these effects is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, moderate positive effects can be ruled out at the 5 percent level. A negative effect of divestiture is similarly found for worker radiation exposure, measured either collectively or on average. When controlling for generation increases, I find that the direct effect on safety is more negative and more statistically significant. For a given capacity factor, the drop in safety incidents is estimated to be 27 percent for initiating events, 54 percent for fires, and 38 percent for escalated enforcement. Results are also larger, although imprecisely estimated, for worker radiation exposure.
The results are similar for a number of robustness checks. In addition, I find larger effects for newer and larger reactors. Matching anecdotal evidence, I find limited evidence of intra-firm spillovers. However, there is no evidence of an effect of consolidation. Finally, there is some evidence for learning over time at divested plants.
Several caveats naturally apply. The empirical safety measures that are available may not be indicative of the risks of catastrophic events. Given the infrequency of large-scale nuclear accidents, they cannot be examined using the empirical framework presented in this paper. Also, safety problems that are uncorrelated with generation (such as on-site security and post-accident preparation) and that develop over longer time horizons (such as spent fuel storage and plant decommissioning) may worsen following plant divestiture. Future work could examine testing and preventive maintenance records for evidence on the effect of divestiture on large-scale and long-term risks. Future work could also extend the model to incorporate the dynamic choices of firms, as has been done for the literature on capacity factors at oil refineries (Chesnes 2009 ).
Overall, this paper speaks to a number of timely issues, including the changing structure of the electricity industry and the incentives for safety at nuclear power plants. Although intuition is given throughout this paper for some of the mechanisms at work, theoretical predictions of the effect of divestitures on plant safety are not possible. As such, an empirical analysis of the effect is the best evidence available. While the infrequency of unsafe events at nuclear plants makes precise statistical estimates difficult, the results match anecdotal evidence. Furthermore, positive effects of moderate magnitude can be ruled out. Finally, the evidence is strong that for given levels of generation, safety improved following divestiture. A. Safety measures:
B. Reliability measures:
C. Reactor characteristics: Notes: Observation is a commercial nuclear power reactor (U.S.) in a year for the left-most three columns and a commercial nuclear power plant in a year for the right-most two columns. Divestiture is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reactor is owned by an independent power producer, and 0 if the reactor is owned by a regulated investor-owned utility. Normalization for the count regressions is accomplished by including capacity factor as an independent variable with coefficient constrained to unity. In columns (1), (2) , and (3), the percentage change in expected value is equal to exp(coefficient) minus one; for columns (4) and (5), it is equal to the coefficient divided by the sample average at non-divested reactors. Notes: Observation is a commercial nuclear power plant (U.S.) in a year. Divestiture is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reactor is owned by an independent power producer, and 0 if the reactor is owned by a regulated investor-owned utility. CNB is a conditional negative binomial; UNB is an unconditional negative binomial with mean dispersion parameterization; OLS is ordinary least squares. Results are nearly identical with an unconditional negative binomial with constant dispersion parameterization. Normalization for the count regressions is accomplished by including capacity factor as an independent variable with coefficient constrained to unity. For the count specifications, the percentage change in expected value is equal to exp(coefficient) minus one; for OLS, it is equal to the coefficient divided by the mean number of counts at non-divested reactors. Observation is a commercial nuclear power reactor (U.S.) in a year for the left-most three columns and a commercial nuclear power plant in a year for the right-most two columns. Divestiture is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reactor is owned by an independent power producer, and 0 if the reactor is owned by an investor-owned utility. Observation is a commercial nuclear power reactor (U.S.) in a year for the left-most three columns and a commercial nuclear power plant in a year for the right-most two columns. Divestiture is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reactor is owned by an independent power producer, and 0 if the reactor is owned by an investor-owned utility. Normalization for the count regressions is accomplished by including capacity factor as an independent variable with coefficient constrained to unity. Notes: Observation is a commercial nuclear power reactor (U.S.) in a year for the left-most three columns and a commercial nuclear power plant in a year for the right-most two columns. Divestiture is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reactor is owned by an independent power producer, and 0 if the reactor is owned by an investor-owned utility. Columns (1), (2), and (3) are Poisson specifications with year and reactor effects. Columns (4) and (5) Notes: Observation is a commercial nuclear power reactor (U.S.) in a year for the left-most three columns and a commercial nuclear power plant in a year for the right-most two columns. Divestiture is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reactor is owned by an independent power producer, and 0 if the reactor is owned by an investor-owned utility. Normalization for the count regressions is accomplished by including capacity factor as an independent variable with coefficient constrained to unity. Columns (1), (2) , and (3) are Poisson specifications with year and reactor effects. Columns (4) and (5) Notes: Co-owned is a dummy equal to 1 if the reactor is not divested, but is owned by a company operating divested units (Dominion, Entergy, and NextEra). Thus the omitted group is non-divested reactors whose parent company operates no divested reactors. Observation is a commercial nuclear power reactor (U.S.) in a year for the left-most three columns and a commercial nuclear power plant in a year for the right-most two columns. Divestiture is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reactor is owned by an independent power producer, and 0 if the reactor is owned by a regulated investor-owned utility. Normalization for the count regressions is accomplished by including capacity factor as an independent variable with coefficient constrained to unity. Notes: Consolidation is a count variable, equal to the number of other reactors owned by the parent company. Observation is a commercial nuclear power reactor (U.S.) in a year for the left-most three columns and a commercial nuclear power plant in a year for the right-most two columns. Divestiture is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reactor is owned by an independent power producer, and 0 if the reactor is owned by a regulated investor-owned utility. Normalization for the count regressions is accomplished by including capacity factor as an independent variable with coefficient constrained to unity. Notes: Learning variable has been scaled to represent a three-year change. Observation is a commercial nuclear power reactor (U.S.) in a year for the left-most three columns and a commercial nuclear power plant in a year for the right-most two columns. Divestiture is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reactor is owned by an independent power producer, and 0 if the reactor is owned by a regulated investor-owned utility. Normalization for the count regressions is accomplished by including capacity factor as an independent variable with coefficient constrained to unity. 
Dependent variable is not normalized
(1) (2) (3) (4)(5)
Profit-Maximization with Reliability
Consider a baseload nuclear power plant in a deregulated electricity generation market. For simplification, assume the power plant has only one reactor. the market price is higher than the nuclear plant's variable costs.
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If the plant is operating, it operates at capacity, i.e., producing quantity q of electricity. Let operating (not total) profits π = pq − c o q. Assume there are no ramping or start-up costs. The plant can choose some level of maintenance a to purchase; thus a is an endogenous effort variable. Increases in a can be thought of as increases in either the quantity or quality of effort. Most maintenance for nuclear power plants requires the plant to be offline, so maintenance incurs both direct costs and lost operating profits. The cost of maintenance is c(a, π), where c(a, π) ≥ 0, > 0. The intuition for the assumptions on the first and second derivatives with respect to operating profits π is that additional maintenance requires a longer time offline, so more revenue is lost. 42 In any given period, there is a probability r(a) ∈ (0, 1) that the plant will experience an unplanned outage (or "scram" or "trip"), conditional on the plant deciding ex-ante to operate. Then the probability of being able to operate as planned is given by 1 − r(a). Assume r (a) < 0: maintenance (effort) decreases the probability of an unplanned outage. Also, r (a) > 0:
40 There is potential for the owner of a nuclear power plant to exercise market power, if it owns other generators. However, if the other generators have higher marginal costs than the nuclear plant, exercising market power by shutting down the nuclear plant is not the first-best strategy of the firm. Rather, the firm would take the higher cost plant offline. Moreover, if the nuclear power plant is baseload, the owner may be required to purchase replacement power when the plant is down. Since the replacement power is more costly than the nuclear plant's generation, the firm has no incentive to exercise market power by taking the nuclear plant offline.
41 For representative supply and demand curves showing nuclear marginal costs compared to fossil fuel costs, see Griffin and Puller (2005) . 42 It is straightforward to consider the case where ∂c ∂π = 0, i.e., maintenance does not require the plant to be offline. the probability decreases at a decreasing rate. Intuitively, the probability asymptotes as maintenance increases. In the event of an unplanned outage, the firm earns no revenue (as it produces no electricity) and incurs additional costs c u > 0. These additional costs may include repair work, increased (safety) regulatory scrutiny, or bad publicity. The firm's profit maximization problem is
The first-order condition is
The firm chooses the level of maintenance a such that the marginal benefit of an additional unit of maintenance −r (a) · π − r (a) · c u equals the marginal cost
. The marginal benefit of an additional unit of maintenance is an increased likelihood of earning revenue and a decreased likelihood of paying for an unplanned outage. Comparative statics on the exogenous revenue and cost variables is straightforward. By the implicit function theorem,
At the profit maximizing level of a, −r (a) · π − r (a) · c u − ∂ 2 c(a,π) ∂ 2 a is negative (by the second order condition, which is satisfied according to the above assumptions), 44 and recall that r (a) is assumed to be negative and is indeterminate; both planned maintenance outages and unplanned outages lead the firm to lose revenue. If one instead assumes that maintenance does not require the plant to be offline, i.e., , since ∂π ∂p = 1.) The sign on ∂a ∂c u is positive; maintenance is increasing in 43 As an alternative way to see how maintenance costs depend on operating profits, re-write the firm's total profits as (1 − r(a) − p(a)) · π − r(a) · c u − c(a), where r(a) ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of an unplanned outage, and p(a) ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of time spent on planned outages. Thus all time is spent on either planned outages, unplanned outages, or generation. As before, r (a) < 0, c (a) > 0, and now p (a) > 0: the time spent on a planned outage is increasing in the amount of maintenance done. Rearranging the firm's total profit function gives (1 − r(a)) · π − r(a) · c u − p(a) · π − c(a). Let c(a, π) = p(a) · π + c(a), so that profits equal (1 − r(a)) · π − r(a) · c u − c(a, π). The latter expression is the same as equation 3, showing how the cost of maintenance depends on operating profits. 44 The key assumption for satisfying the second order condition is that r (a) > 0. Intuitively, this is satisfied for large a if the probability of an unplanned outage asymptotes towards zero as maintenance increases. If r(a) is S-shaped, with r (a) < 0 for small values of a, there could be a corner solution with no maintenance. All that is necessary to rule out this case is to assume that the optimal a is beyond the inflection point; alternatively, one could assume that the regulatory body governing safety (the NRC) requires a minimum level of maintenance.
the cost of an unplanned outage.
Profit-Maximization with Reliability and Safety
The above model considers plant reliability rather than safety. Suppose that the probability of an unsafe event is s(a) ∈ (0, 1) with s (a) < 0 and s (a) > 0; that is, the same maintenance actions that improve reliability also improve safety. Suppose the total cost of an unsafe event is c s > 0, of which some fraction θ are borne by the plant, and the remaining fraction (1 − θ)
are borne by society. 
The social optimum is similar but with θ = 1 (society internalizes all of the safety costs). The firm's first-order condition is
The firm, which does not bear the entire safety cost c s , exerts less effort a than is socially optimal. However, note that even if the firm internalizes none of the safety costs (i.e., θ = 0), the firm invests in maintenance (because of the reliability costs) that has a positive impact on safety. The social optimum can be achieved if a regulatory agency requires the firm to conduct the optimal level of maintenance. In practice, this may be difficult if the regulatory agency does not have complete information on the cost function c(a, π) or the reliability and safety functions r(a) and s(a). 45 See above for a summary of nuclear reactor liability in the U.S. under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA). 46 As before, the key assumptions for satisfying the second order condition are that r (a) > 0 and s (a) > 0. 
Denote the above as follows, where a < 0, b < 0, the sign of c is indeterminate, d > 0, e < 0, and f > 0:
= − is negative: potential operating profits unambiguously lower the optimal expenditures on safety maintenance. This follows from the assumption that safety maintenance requires that the plant be offline; if we instead assume ∂ 2 c(a s ,π) ∂a s ∂π = 0, then potential operating profits will not affect the optimal expenditures on safety maintenance. Notes: Observation is a commercial nuclear power reactor (U.S.) in a year. Divestiture is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reactor is owned by an independent power producer, and 0 if the reactor is owned by a regulated investor-owned utility. Normalization is accomplished by including capacity factor as an independent variable with coefficient constrained to unity.Samples dates vary by variable. Initiating events are 1988-2009; fires are 1991-2009; and escalated enforcement is 1996-2009. For fires and escalated enforcement, some reactors (34 and 5, respectively) are dropped because all observations are zero. Additionally, some observations have zero capacity factor and are dropped. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 repetitions. Stars (*, **, and ***) denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance.
